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Abstract
Human interaction often appears to be random and at times even
chaotic. We use game theory, the mathematical study of interactive deci-
sion making, to explain the role of rationality and randomness in strategic
behavior. In many of these situations, humans deliberately create random-
ness as a best response and equilibrium strategy. Moreover, once out of
equilibrium, individual beliefs about the real intentions of others intro-
duce signiﬁcant randomness into otherwise quite simple and deterministic
situations of interaction. In a second step we discuss the role of ran-
domness on ﬁnancial markets, which are prototypical institutions for the
aggregation of individual behavior. As in certain simple games, ﬁnancial
markets can produce outcomes that are close to perfect randomness. In
fact, random walks in ﬁnancial returns are considered by most scholars
to be eﬃcient and desirable. Finally, we apply game theoretical insights
to behavior on ﬁnancial markets and show how strategic speculation on
`greater fools' can create a `madness of crowds' that often ends in chaotic
swings, bubbles and crashes.
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1 Introduction
In 1720, Sir Isaac Newton was heavily invested in the South Sea bubble. When
the stock bubble burst he lost a fortune of about ¿2.4 million (in present day
terms) and was quoted as stating: I can calculate the movement of the stars,
but not the madness of crowds.
The interaction between humans does indeed often appear like madness,
governed by error and randomness. There is, however, a scientiﬁc ﬁeld that at-
tempts to logically explain human interaction. Game theory is the mathematical
study of interactive decision making and it has revolutionized the way we see
and understand economics, politics, ﬁnancial markets, and many other aspects
of human society. Game theory also applies to other species than humans and
has made important contributions in, for example, biology.
This chapter will introduce simple game theoretical concepts and ﬁnancial
market applications to explain how we interact in certain situations and what
role randomness plays in our behavior. The central question is how people
deal with strategic uncertainty, which is the uncertainty about other people's
expectations and actions that we face in human interaction. We then apply this
approach to ﬁnancial markets and discuss how heterogeneous beliefs and errors
in updating can create feedback cycles and the `madness of crowds' Newton
referred to.
2 Super-humans against nature and the rational-
ity assumption
2.1 A single random event
Imagine a very simple game against nature.
Coin toss: First, human bets on one side of the coin, heads or
tails. Then, in the coin toss, nature shows one side of the coin.1
Many people see the throw of a dice or a coin toss as a prime example for natural
randomness. For at least 5000 years, our ancestors used randomization devices.2
But is a coin toss really random? This goes back to an age old discussion cul-
minating in the question whether the world is predictable or unpredictable;
whether everything is predetermined, or whether nature is inherently stochas-
tic. During the Age of Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, Isaac
Newton's advances in mechanics suggested that the universe is predictably gov-
erned by simple physical laws. This lead to the lofty notion that, one day,
1Another example of such a situation is a farmer who decides at the beginning of a year
whether to plant crops or not (human places a bet). There is an equal chance that the weather
this year is good or bad for crops (toss of a coin). It is up to nature to determine the outcome.
2The oldest known dice were part of an 5000-year-old backgammon set, excavated at the
Burnt City in southeastern Iran. In ancient times the outcome of a throw of a dice was seen
as the decision of God. Consequently, dice were frequently used in important decisions.
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humans might be able to take full control over their fate with a world formula.
In 1814, the French astronomer and mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace fa-
mously described the idea of scientiﬁc determinism as a perfect intelligence for
which there exists no uncertainty (Laplace, 1814).3
Laplace's Demon, as his notion became known, comes close to the deﬁnition
of rationality in game theory. A completely rational agent is a super-human,
an artiﬁcial construct that comes in handy when economists and game theorists
need to build models. Like Laplace's Demon, this super-human knows every-
thing (`perfect knowledge') and can compute even the most complex problems
with lightning speed. Another feature of this super-human is that she always
strives to maximize her own utility.4
In Laplace's scientiﬁc determinism, a coin toss is a quite boring aﬀair. So
would be Roulette or wheels of fortune. A super-human would simply know
what side of the coin nature would show and bet accordingly. Scientiﬁc deter-
minism remained the oﬃcial dogma throughout the 19th century. This drasti-
cally changed with the `probabilistic revolution in physics' initiated by statistical
mechanics in the mid nineteenth century and continued by quantum mechanics
in the early twentieth century (see Lüthy & Palmerino in this book).
But even without assuming unpredictable quantum states in quantum sys-
tems we may not be able to forecast with certainty, even in Laplace's determin-
istic world. Early works, for example, by Henry Poincaré have shown that, in
deterministic systems, inﬁnitesimally small changes in starting conditions can
produce unpredictable outcomes.5 This insight is the foundation of determin-
istic chaos theory and it took nearly a hundred years for the `chaos revolution'
to fully unfold. In the late 1960s, the MIT meteorologist Edward Lorenz dis-
covered what is commonly referred to as the `butterﬂy eﬀect'.6 In the 1970s,
several mathematicians proved that simple nonlinear dynamic systems can pro-
duce irregular long run behavior and chaotic behavior without external random
disturbance (Ruelle and Takens, 1971; Li and Yorke, 1975).7 In nonlinear dy-
namic systems, predictions about the future become progressively worse when
we do not have absolutely perfect knowledge of the initial state. Thus, even af-
3See the contribution of Lüthy & Palmerino in this book for a more detailed discussion.
4Utility maximization is a tricky concept, which many mix up with ruthless money-making
and egoism. First, utility is more than simply making money. Feeling happy, receiving love
or any other positive sensation can also be a utility that people strive to maximize. This
all depends on personal preferences. Given a choice between money and friendship, one
person might prefer the former and another the latter. Second, a human can gain satisfaction
(utility) from helping others. Did Mother Teresa only help others or also herself? Hence,
being `altruistic' can be perfectly in line with the deﬁnition of own utility maximization and
rationality.
5In 1887, king Oscar II of Sweden promised a prize for the best answer to the question `Is
our solar system stable?'. Poincaré showed that the motion in a simple three-body system 
such as sun, earth and moon  that interact through gravitational attraction, can be sensitively
dependent on initial conditions and become highly irregular and unpredictable.
6Lorenz and his team were running weather simulations on a computer and suddenly
realized that rounding errors in the third decimal of just one measurement in one corner of
their map (a `ﬂap of a butterﬂy') were able to change predictions in another area from clear
skies to thunderstorms.
7A well-known application is logistic population growth in biology (May, 1976).
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ter the discovery of quantum physics, chaos theory re-introduced indeterminism
`through the back door' and at a surprisingly fundamental level.8
We will come back to deterministic chaos in complex systems in Section 5.3.
For the time being, it is important to note that, according to quantum physics,
but also to chaos theory, even a perfectly rational Laplacian super-human 
without any restriction in knowledge and cognition  would approach a simple
coin toss against nature in the same way as normal humans would: as a game of
pure chance. This is in line with game theory where a perfectly rational agent is
still exposed to randomness. When facing a coin ﬂip, a rational decision maker,
even when equipped with perfect knowledge, will not know whether the outcome
will be head or tails.
2.2 Repeated random events
Fortunately, once faced with many independent coin tosses, our perfectly ratio-
nal super-human can forecast the future very well.
Repeated coin toss: We start with no money and every minute
nature oﬀers us a coin toss where we can either win one dollar (heads)
or lose one dollar (tails). Our lifetime wealth then develops according
to what is known as a `random walk': we start at zero and might
win a dollar, then another dollar (two dollars of wealth), then we
may lose ﬁve dollars in a row (minus three dollars wealth), but then
we win some money again, and so on.
What is our average lifetime wealth? According to the law of large numbers and
the central limit theorem we can be almost certain to have earned an average of
zero. Why? We have an equal chance to win or lose one dollar, on average, zero
dollar. With millions of coin tosses, the gains and losses almost perfectly cancel
each other out. On average, we expect to gain or lose nothing. We therefore
also say that the expected value of such a coin toss is zero.
There is a catch, however. An expected value of zero dollar does not mean
that we actually receive zero dollar. The expected value of a single coin toss
is zero, but we still know for sure that the outcome will not be zero. Equally,
just because we know that the average wealth over our life time is going to be
very close to zero, our ﬁnal wealth at the end of our life time will most probably
not be zero. In fact, our ﬁnal wealth will probably be substantially above or
below zero. Our ﬁnal wealth is not an average but a single realization and it
is impossible to predict this exact point. Hence, even if we are conﬁdent in
predicting averages, we are not very good at exact point predictions.
Figure 1 shows this intuitively with a Galton board, named after the English
scientist Sir Francis Galton. The horizontal position of the red ball dropped into
the Galton board represents the wealth level and the pegs represent the coin
tosses. Every time the red ball hits a peg there is an equal chance to fall to the
left hand side (loss of one dollar) or the right hand side (gain of one dollar).
8We thank Klaas Landsman for valuable contributions to this and the previous paragraph.
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Each red ball follows a random walk and many of these random walks (red
balls) produce a binomial distribution of ﬁnal wealth levels, as approximated by
the distribution of red balls at the bottom of the Galton board. As binomial
distributions are symmetric, the expected value of random walks, the average,
is zero (the middle slot at the bottom). The large majority of the red balls,
however, does not land in the middle slot. Therefore, although we can be quite
sure to expect an average of zero wealth, individual ﬁnal wealth levels are most
probably not zero and the exact ﬁnal wealth level (ﬁnal slot) of one single ball
is unpredictable.
Figure 1: Galton board
2.3 Risk preferences
How much would we bet on a single coin toss against nature in which we can win
or lose one dollar? This depends on our risk preferences. The expected value is
zero, so if we are risk-neutral we should oﬀer the expected value, which is zero.
This makes us indiﬀerent between playing the game or not. But we might be
risk-seeking. As the ﬁnal wealth level of a single coin toss is certainly not zero, we
might want to bet on the positive outcome of the coin toss and pay anything from
1 to 99 cents for playing the game. How much we are willing to pay for playing
the coin toss is an indication of our risk-seekingness. Conversely, we might have
a preference to prevent losses and to  at least partially  safeguard our current
wealth level. In this case we are risk-averse and we require nature to pay us some
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amount from 1 to 99 cents to take the risk (play the game). The more risk averse
we are, the more attractive nature must make the game for us to accept it. So,
how much we are willing to pay/accept to play the game depends solely on our
personal risk preferences. This also applies to fully rational super-humans. We
assume that personal preferences are given and stable, but heterogeneous across
individuals. Rational players are not necessarily risk-neutral. They can have
any risk preference and maximize their payoﬀ conditional on their preference.
Moreover, we can have diﬀerent types of preferences, not only for risk, but also
for altruism or equality or with regard to other economic and social dimensions.
3 Super-humans against super-humans
The crucial characteristic of fully rational super-humans is that they have perfect
knowledge about the rules of the game and know that this also applies to all
other players, including the knowledge that they are also fully rational. The
latter is called the `common rationality assumption'. Given this deﬁnition of
rationality, let's see what happens if two super-humans play the following game.
Centipede game: Two super-humans, Superboy and Supergirl,
play ball with each other. Nature randomly gives Supergirl the ball.
She can decide to throw the ball to Superboy, or not. If she passes
the ball, Superboy can decide to throw it back, or not. The game is
ﬁnished either after 100 passes or if one of the two players decides
not to pass the ball anymore. Nature also puts a number on the
ball and increases it by 10 with every pass. When Supergirl gets the
ball from nature, the number on the ball is 10. After the ﬁrst pass,
Superboy catches a ball displaying 20 on it. With the next pass the
number changes to 30, and so on. If a player decides not to pass
the ball, s/he gets the number on the ball paid out in dollar and
the other player gets the same number divided by 10. Hence, the
holder of the ball receives 10 + n × 10 dollar and the other player
(10 + n× 10)/10 = 1 + n dollar after n passes.
Assuming that both players prefer to earn some money over nothing at all, how
many passes do we observe between the two players? In game theory, analyses
typically start at the end and then move backwards to the beginning. This
is what we call `backward induction'. After 100 successfully completed passes,
Supergirl will get the ball back and receive 1010 dollar. But Superboy can see
this coming and therefore does not pass the last ball back. Then Superboy gets
1000 dollar and Supergirl 100. Knowing this, Supergirl would not even pass the
second-to-last ball to Superboy. Knowing this, Superboy would not make the
pass before that one, and so on. Hence, when Supergirl receives the ball from
nature, she does not even do the ﬁrst pass and takes the 10 dollar. Superboy
receives 1 dollar.
Supergirl's behavior is an equilibrium strategy. Under the common rational-
ity assumption, Supergirl knows the equilibrium strategy of Superboy (keeping
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the ball) and she cannot beneﬁt from changing her chosen strategy, while Super-
boy keeps his strategy unchanged. This applies to both players as none of the
two players would pass the ball if randomly chosen by nature as ﬁrst receiver.
The current set of strategies and the corresponding payoﬀs constitute a Nash
equilibrium, named after the mathematician and John Nash.9
Backward induction is often not very intuitive, which is one of the reasons
why we have to assume super-humans. In many games only super-humans are
actually able to `see' the end of the game, keep it in mind, rationally backward
induct, ﬁnd the game-theoretical equilibrium strategy and ﬁnally play the corre-
sponding equilibrium behavior ﬂawlessly right from the beginning. Also, under
the common rationality assumption we assume that everybody in the game is a
super-human and everybody knows this. This takes all randomness out of the
centipede game. Does this mean that randomness never plays a role for super-
humans and always leads to determinism unless a mechanistic randomization
device is introduced? Not quite. The point is that Supergirl may know every-
thing about Superboy's reasoning, preferences and incentives, but this does not
mean that Superboy's actions are always predictable. In fact, there are games
where fully rational players want to be as unpredictable as possible.
Rock-Paper-Scissors: Supergirl and Superboy simultaneously choose
either Rock, Paper or Scissors. Rock beats Scissors, Paper beats
Rock, Scissors beats Paper.
Each strategy has a 1/3 chance to win, 1/3 chance to draw and 1/3 chance to
lose. If Supergirl thinks that Superboy always plays Rock she could beat him
with always choosing Paper. But this is not a Nash equilibrium as Superboy
could improve on this strategy set by always choosing Scissors. This, again,
would lead Supergirl to always choose Rock, and so it goes round and round.
The only equilibrium strategy in this situation is to mix the three options as
randomly as possible in order to win a least in 1/3 of all tries, draw in 1/3, and
lose in 1/3. So, the solution to this game is to play sequences that are perfectly
random and unpredictable, just like a three-sided dice would be.
This is harder than we think. Humans are not very good at simulating ran-
dom patterns. For example, in `randomizing' we often underestimate clustering.
This is the so-called gambler's fallacy, which describes the phenomenon that hu-
mans tend to expect a coin toss to show tails with a higher probability after
a sequence of heads (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1974). In other situations
we may fall prey to the hot-hand-eﬀect (Gilovich et al., 1985). Here, we tend
to believe that a series of heads indicates a higher likelihood of heads in future
coin tosses.10
9It does not make a diﬀerence if the two players communicate with each other. Whatever
Superboy promises, he cannot commit to it. Therefore his answer is cheap talk. In fact, given
his monetary preferences he has a clear commitment to keep the ball, because this maximizes
his payoﬀ. Knowing this, Supergirl will keep the ball even if Superboy promises to pass it
back.
10This phenomenon is found in sports, where people falsely attribute skill to a random series
of wins and therefore believe that the team will win again. The same also applies to the believe
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Of course, Supergirl and Superboy can randomize perfectly so that both win,
draw and lose with equal probability over the long run. But as a thought exper-
iment, let's take the Laplacian view to the extreme and see what would happen
if fully rational super-humans would really know everything with absolute cer-
tainty. What would happen if the brains of two players are two completely
transparent randomization devices (we basically see all neurons ﬁre) and both
players are able to perfectly anticipate  as a point prediction  what the other
side will choose in the next round? In this situation, the only equilibrium strat-
egy for both players would be to always play the same as the other so that every
game ends in a draw.11 But what happens if a draw is not an option?
Matching pennies: Supergirl and Superboy each choose either
heads or tails simultaneously. So, they both toss a virtual coin.
Supergirl wins if the two coins match (heads and heads or tails and
tails). Superboy wins in all other cases (coins do not match).
As in Rock-Paper-Scissors the Nash equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium strategy
where both players have to perfectly randomize in order to win/lose half the
time. Draw, however, is not an outcome. Thus, if super-humans could perfectly
look into each other's brains, both players would constantly point-predict the
opponent's intention for the next move, update, change their own intentions and
point-predict again, only to realize that the opponent's intention has changed
accordingly, and so on. In this setting, both players are frozen in an inﬁnite
optimization without the ability to act. This may be where free will or emotions
are ultimately needed as `circuit-breaker'. It may be that "to make a decision,
emotion is the necessary trigger (and) without emotion, one would be reduced
to the state of an idiot savant who goes on endlessly calculating without the
ability to make a choice" (Olsen, 1998)
4 Humans against humans
4.1 Bounded rationality
Rationality requires extreme assumptions concerning players cognitive abilities:
perfect knowledge about all factors that aﬀect the decision to be taken - so
basically about everything - and virtually inﬁnite computing abilities to derive
rational expectations forecasts and optimal decisions. Needless to say that we
are no super-humans. And needless to say that no economist seriously believes
that random successes in the past in investment performance will continue in the future. The
hot-hand-eﬀect applies less to situations where people have to randomize themselves, but more
to situations where people have to correctly `read' or identify random patterns produced by
others.
11In terms of payoﬀ it would not even matter whether two super-humans always play draw
or perfectly randomize and win, draw and lose equally often. All that matters is that both
know with certainty which of the two meta-strategies they will play: a perfect point-prediction
of each other's next draw or a perfect randomization across the three options rock, paper, and
scissors.
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that human behavior is always fully rational. Rationality is only a benchmark
model, but a very powerful one. It allows us to analyze benchmark behav-
ior, which, under evolutionary pressure and over time, is theoretically more
successful in dealing with nature and its randomness than any other model.
Nevertheless, it is far from present in every human, in all situations, or at all
times. In the 1950s, Herbert Simon advocated the concept of bounded rational-
ity, a more realistic description of human behavior where agents have limited
computing capacities and information (Simon, 1955). Instead of perfectly op-
timal decision rules, boundedly rational players use short-cuts, rules of thumb,
or so-called heuristics to overcome 'uncomputable' problems. These heuristics
are not necessarily optimal or perfect but in complex environments they may
perform reasonably well (for a discussion see Gigerenzer and Selten (2002)). By
using heuristics we inevitably make mistakes, which may be random but can
also be biased.
4.2 Beliefs
As we cannot know everything, we are uncertain about the actions and be-
liefs (and beliefs about the beliefs) of others. This is commonly referred to as
strategic uncertainty. Let's assume that Superboy and Supergirl in the above
ball game (centipede game) can actually make mistakes. In other words, they
are not super-humans anymore but simply humans: Girl and Boy. Let's also
assume, that Girl, who received the ball from nature ﬁrst, actually passes the
ball to Boy. Remember that this is a move that super-humans would never do
because it is no Nash equilibrium. However, as we now look at humans, there is
a possibility that Boy receives the ball and suddenly has to form a belief about
Girl's motives for passing the ball. Here are some beliefs that Boy might hold
about Girl:
1. Girl violates rationality and made a mistake. She passed the ball, because
she simply did not understand the game properly. She did not backward
induct and did not realize that passing the ball in the ﬁrst place is not
fully rational.
2. Girl has other preferences (other than purely monetary ones). Maybe she
passed the ball because she is altruistic and actually wants Boy to get the
proﬁt from the game. So, Girl actually gets more utility out of giving Boy
the proﬁts than keeping the ball and the money to herself.
3. Girl aims for a more eﬃcient outcome. As the pot is increasing for both
with every pass, Girl might expect that Boy colludes with her against
nature. After the last pass, Girl and Boy would have extracted the highest
possible proﬁt from nature. For this, however, Girls would have to believe
that Boy passes the last ball back to her (or have altruistic preferences).
Of course, the dilemma of the situation is that Boy does not know what Girl's
underlying motivation was when she passed the ball. Boy has to form a belief
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about Girl's intentions, but he cannot know for sure. To make matters worse, in
a world of many players, there are many possible beliefs and weighted mixtures
of beliefs about each other's underlying motivations.
With certain assumptions, game theory can deal with these situations. For
example, let us assume that all deviations from the rational equilibrium are
because of the ﬁrst of the above reasons. If people make independent and
unbiased mistakes and we know about this, then Boy can compute how probable
it is that Girl makes another mistake.12 If players believe in a suﬃciently high
error rate, they end up in a 'Quantal Response Equilibrium' (QRE) of passing
the ball at least once (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Mckelvey and Palfrey, 1998).
In fact, experimental evidence shows that the vast majority of people pass the
ball more than once. Repeated rounds of this game also show, however, that
the experienced error rate in the population in early rounds feeds into people's
behavior in later rounds, which can then be explained quite rationally in a QRE
sense (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992).
The basic reasoning in the centipede game is not restricted to sequential
moves but can also take place in a one shot decision as the following example
shows.
Guessing game: Every person in a larger group is asked to pri-
vately pick a number from 0 to 100 and write it on a piece of paper.
An experimenter collects the numbers and computes the average.
The person with the number that is closest to 2/3 of the group aver-
age wins. These rules are known to everybody before they pick the
number (Moulin, 1986).
Let's assume that everybody in the room (except you) randomly picks a number.
Then the group's average would be 50 and you would pick 2/3 ∗ 50 = 33. If
everybody thinks that, everybody would pick 33 and you should pick 2/3∗33 =
22. Then again, if everybody does that you should pick 14.6¯, 9.7¯, 6.5 etc. until
you reach 0. Depending on their number, players exhibit distinct, boundedly
rational levels of cognitive reasoning (Nagel, 1995). Players with no level of
reasoning ('Level 0') pick a random number, 'Level 1' players pick 33, 'Level
2' players pick 22, and so forth. In experiments, most players reveal ﬁrst- and
second-order depth of reasoning (Nagel, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004).
Under the common rationality assumption, there is no strategic uncertainty
about the others. Hence, if all players have an inﬁnite level of reasoning, all
players choose the number 0, which is the Nash equilibrium of this game. Zero
is the only value where everybody in the group can win.
In a QRE-world, however, where we believe that some of us makes mistakes,
0 would not be a best response or equilibrium. We would have to pick a positive
number, but which one exactly solely depends on our belief about the error
12Of course, it might also be that Girl did not make a mistake at all but instead assumed
that Boy would make a mistake. She might have passed the ball in the expectation that Boy
erroneously passes it back. Hence, if we assume mistakes, observing a 'mistake' might not
actually be a real error, but rational speculation on the other side making one. See Osborne
(2003) for a discussion on this
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rate of the other people in the group. Thus, to win this game in the real
world, rational players should not choose the theoretical Nash equilibrium but
a positive number. Interestingly, when doing so, we cannot tell anymore from
the outside whether the winner was extremely rational or made a mistake and
was simply lucky.
There are several other models that try to explain the real-world deviations
from the Nash equilibrium in both the centipede and the guessing game (a.k.a.
beauty contest). Cognitive hierarchy models, for example, assume that each
player has a ﬁnite depth of reasoning and believes that s/he is the most sophis-
ticated player in the game. Thus, in the guessing game, a Level 2 player will
assume that all others are Level 1 and therefore choose 22. A Level 3 player
expects all others to be Level 2 and chooses 14.6¯, and so on.13 Another branch
of game theory, referred to as 'global games', attempts to deal with the second of
the above reasons (other preferences), by assuming various simultaneous payoﬀ
structures that each player may face with a certain probability (Carlsson and
Damme, 1993).
In essence, all models advance possible ways how certain beliefs about other
players' actions and beliefs are formed. Depending on these beliefs, practically
all out-of-equilibrium outcomes can be reached. However, as all models plausibly
describe experimentally observed outcomes, we still lack a fundamental under-
standing of belief formation processes. How are initial beliefs (priors) about
others are formed under strategic uncertainty? How quickly do people learn
and in which way?14 A common assumption is that people form expectations
and update their beliefs about the real state of the world according to some
learning scheme (Sargent, 1993). Many studies in neuroscience, particularly in
the area of sensorimotor control, suggest that our brain is a Bayesian prediction
machine.15 We would not be able to catch a ball without continuous forecasting
and updating of priors about its most likely trajectory (Doya, 2007). When it
comes to cognitive processes, however, other studies have shown that we are
not very good at Bayesian updating. For example, in the assessment of proba-
bilities, people have been shown to neglect base rates (Kahneman and Tversky,
1973). In stock markets, investors seem to over- and under-react to diﬀerent
types of news (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). Alternative models, for example,
reinforcement learning and adaptive learning of simple forecasting heuristics or
anchor and adjustment processes, are cognitively less demanding and allow for
13In the centipede game, if Girl is Level 0 (non-strategic), she will compare the payoﬀs at
each possible endpoint of the game. As the pot is increasing for both with every pass, she will
note that her highest reward results from Boy passing the ball on the ﬁnal round. Girl will
thus choose to always pass the ball. If Girl is Level 1, she will note that this outcome is not
feasible for Boy on the last round and choose not to pass the ball on her last round. If Girl is
Level 2, she expects that Boy is Level 1 and that he will, therefore, anticipate her ending the
game on her last round. She therefore chooses to end the game on the second to last round,
and so on.
14For example, in the centipede game, assume that Boy believes Girl is rational, but then
he suddenly gets the ball. How did Boy come to his initial belief in the ﬁrst place, and how
does he adapt his belief given that Girl did not behave accordingly?
15Also see the chapter of Bekkering, van Elk and Friston in this book.
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more errors (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Hommes, 2013).
At the extreme end of the spectrum, some psychologists argue that beliefs come
ﬁrst and that the brain is nothing more than a chatterbox that rationalizes
beliefs ex post. The brain looks for patterns in sensory data and infuses them
with meaning, forming beliefs. Then, it primarily focuses on the selection of
conﬁrmatory evidence that reinforces those beliefs in a positive feedback loop.16
4.3 Speculation
With heterogeneous beliefs and diﬀerent levels of reasoning, speculation comes
into play. We focus on ﬁnancial speculation, which aims at making a proﬁt
from price movements in a market, even if these price movements are completely
unrelated to the fundamental value of the underlying asset or its proceeds (e.g.,
dividends or interest).17 This can be seen in the following adaptation of the
centipede game from (Moinas and Pouget, 2013).
Bubble game: An asset, commonly known to have no funda-
mental value, is traded in a sequential market with three traders.
At each point in the sequence, an incoming trader has two choices.
S/he can either accept a buy oﬀer at a given price and oﬀer it to
the next trader in line at a higher price, or s/he can reject the buy
oﬀer, which leaves the current owner stuck with a worthless asset.
The last trader in the sequence cannot sell the asset anymore. Thus,
when traders buy the asset, they eﬀectively speculate on not being
last and on being able to sell it to the next trader at a higher price.
Traders do not know their position in the market sequence. They
do, however, receive a signal about their position. This signal is the
price of the asset that has been oﬀered to them. The higher the
oﬀered price the higher the probability of being last in the sequence.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the game. All traders receive 1
dollar initial capital. Trader 1 is oﬀered to buy the asset at a randomly drawn
price P1 by nature.
18 Trader 1 does not know whether the oﬀer comes from
nature or a previous trader (as s/he does not know her position in the sequence
for sure).19 When Trader 1 rejects the oﬀer the game ends and all traders earn
one dollar of initial capital. When Trader 1 accepts the oﬀer, the asset is oﬀered
16A recent bestseller of psychologist and science historian Michael Shermer has popularized
this view (Shermer, 2012).
17Despite many disadvantages and public criticism, speculation also has positive functions,
for example, to provide liquidity in ﬁnancial markets, which makes it easier or even possible
for others to oﬀset risk.
18As the random price can be above 1 dollar, we assume that a ﬁnancial partner (who is
not part of the game) provides each player with suﬃcient capital to be able to buy the asset.
When selling the asset the ﬁnancial partner gets all the proﬁts except for 10 dollar which the
trader receives.
19There are only two cases where traders can know their position for sure: when the oﬀered
price is the minimum or the maximum of the range of randomly drawn prices, which signal
with certainty that they are at the ﬁrst or last position in the sequence, respectively. For all
other prices, however, traders can only infer a probability not to be last.
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to Trader 2 at a price P2 > P1. When Trader 2 rejects, the game ends: Trader
1 earns nothing and Trader 2 and 3 each earn their initial capital (1 dollar).
When Trader 2 accepts, Trader 1 successfully sells the asset and earns 10 dollar.
Trader 2 then oﬀers the asset to Trader 3 at P3 > P2. When Trader 3 rejects,
the game ends and Trader 2 is stuck with the worthless asset (Trader 1 gets 10
dollar, see above). As Trader 3 does not know for sure whether s/he is last in
row she might buy the asset, but will be unable to resell. In this case Trader
3 gets nothing and Trader 1 and 2 each enjoy 10 dollar proﬁt from successful
reselling.
Figure 2: Bubble game (extensive form)
The Nash equilibrium of the bubble game is very similar to the centipede
game: due to backward induction no trader should buy the asset. Thus, the
ﬁrst, randomly drawn price P1 of the asset will not be accepted by Trader 1.
Accordingly, the market value for the asset is equal to its fundamental value,
namely 0. In their experiments, however, Moinas and Pouget (2013) ﬁnd sub-
stantial trading of this worthless asset and the formation of signiﬁcant price
bubbles. Theoretically, the QRE povides the best explanation for this buying
behavior (Moinas and Pouget, 2013). Traders seem to believe that their fel-
low traders down the line will make mistakes. It is therefore rational for them
to speculate on such mistakes and buy the asset as long as the probability to
sell it to someone next in line is high enough. This result is very much in
line with the famous 'greater fool theory' (Long et al., 1990), which suggests
that rational traders buy overvalued assets in the expectation that a 'greater
fool' down the line will mistakenly buy the asset at an even higher price.20 In
fact, experimental tests show that individuals who speculate a lot in this game
also produce stronger bubbles and crashes in more realistic and dynamic double
auction trading environments (Janssen et al., 2015).
20'Greater fools' are also often called 'noise traders', because they are seen to buy and sell
assets in ﬁnancial markets at random, like 'white noise'. Classical examples of noise traders
are inexperienced individuals who inherit some money and decide to invest it in some random
portfolio in the stock market.
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5 The madness of crowds
As explained in the previous section, speculators may try to ride a bubble in
the belief that there are enough fools out there to buy them out. This can be
a rational strategy and there are many scientiﬁc models that explain the exis-
tence of such rational bubbles in ﬁnancial markets (see Stracca (2004) for an
overview). It seems that there are potentially enough greater fools out there
for more professional traders to speculate on. Heterogeneous agent models in
ﬁnance assume that market participants are very diﬀerent, not only with re-
spect to preferences but also in terms of market experience, ﬁnancial literacy
and speculative sophistication (Hommes, 2006). Empirical studies show that
private traders, who are considered to be less sophisticated than professional
traders, do not gain from their trading on average and actually underperform
after deduction of transaction costs. Instead of (noise) trading, private investors
could have made more money buy simply investing into a broadly diversiﬁed
stock market index and do nothing (Barber and Odean, 2000).
Speculating on greater fools, however, entails the risk to exit the market too
late when not enough fools are left to buy the overpriced stocks. To complicate
matters it is possible that speculators feed on each other, mistaking purchases
of other speculators as noise. As in the guessing game it is often hard to tell
whether a winning bid was really smart or simply lucky, particularly when there
is a lot of noise. Warren Buﬀet, one of the richest and most successful investors
of all time, once warned: Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of eﬀortless
money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift
into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying
the festivitiesthat is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic
valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the futurewill
eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a
single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all
plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There's a problem, though: They
are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.21
5.1 Luck versus skill
This raises the question how speculators can be viewed as professional rational
agents who exploit noise traders and, at the same time, as 'giddy Cinderellas'
who miss the point of exit. The answer is that, although professional traders and
sophisticated speculators may not be greater fools, even they cannot beat the
market in the long run, which makes them fools, too; maybe lesser fools, but fools
after all. This notion is a direct implication of the eﬃcient market hypothesis
(EMH), which states that nobody can systematically beat the market. The
value of a ﬁnancial asset is deﬁned by its expected future cash ﬂow, discounted
to its present value. Through the market mechanism, all relevant forecasts
of market participants are compounded in market prices. If ﬁnancial markets
21Warren Buﬀet, Letter to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2000, p.14.
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are eﬃcient, which means that all information about possible future states of
nature and cash ﬂows are impounded in market prices instantaneously, then the
residual price movements must be triggered by genuine surprises, which nobody
has seen coming and which are therefore, by deﬁnition, a random walk (Fama,
1965).
For a graphic representation, let's extend the Galton board in Figure 1 to
1000 rows of pegs, run a couple of balls through it and track their paths. Figure
3 shows some of the random walks of these balls, turned by 90 degrees so that
they now `fall' horizontally along the x-axis of 1000 pegs. Remember that this
is equivalent to a 1000 coin tosses in which we can either lose or gain a dollar.
Most random walks will deviate substantially and for longer periods from wealth
levels of zero. Two thirds can deviate as far as ±31.70 dollars, indicated by the
two dotted lines, which are deﬁned by σ × √n: the standard deviation of the
coin toss (σ = 1) and the number of tosses (n = 1000). One third of all random
walks will deviate at some point to wealth levels above and below σ × √n, as
the two outliers show with wealth levels of ±100 dollars.22
Figure 3: Random walks
As the EMH predicts, the random walks in Figure 3 have a high resem-
blance with stock price charts. In fact, some surveys indicate that stock market
traders and other ﬁnancial professionals cannot reliably tell the diﬀerence be-
tween random walks and real stock price developments (Siegel, 2013). Many
studies in ﬁnancial economics show that the performance of the vast majority of
ﬁnancial professionals is due to (random) luck and not skill (Fama and French,
2010; Malkiel, 1995). Luck to be active in a certain period and in a certain
22Theoretically, if enough red balls fall through the Galton board, 1000 pegs or coin ﬂips can
produce a sequence of 1000 heads, leading to a ﬁnal wealth of 1000 dollar. This is equivalent
to Émile Borel's inﬁnitely typewriting ape, published in 1913. At one point in time, by chance,
this ape will have produced the Bible or Hamlet or any other ﬁnite text.
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class of investments. As a famous multi-annual experiment by the Wall Street
Journal showed there is a very high likelihood that a dart-throwing monkey is
an equally `skilled' stock market forecaster as professional investment advisers
(Porter, 2005). If an investment manager has an exceptional track record of
past investments, there is a good chance that we have met the upper outlier
random walk in Figure 3 and not somebody who can consistently predict super-
investments that others simply did not see. The catch with random walks is that
the expected value of all future coin ﬂips does not change and always remains
zero, no matter at which point we currently are. This is what mathematicians
and ﬁnance scholars call a 'martingale': at each point in a realized random se-
quence, the conditional expectation of the next value in the sequence is equal to
the current value, irrespective of the preceding sequence. The martingale prop-
erty of asset returns in eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets is the reason why governments
warn clients that past investment performance provides no indication for the
future. Unfortunately, too many investors believe that signiﬁcant positive de-
viations from the x-axis are a signal of skill and not luck (Hoﬀmann and Post,
2014).23 In doing so, they fall prey to the self-attribution bias, which is the
tendency to attribute success to one's own disposition and failure to external
forces (Miller and Ross, 1975; Feather and Simon, 1971).
The prevalence of the EMH is the reason why traders say that there is 'no
free lunch at Wall Street'. You cannot simply predict future stock prices from
some charts (its preceding sequence) and make some easy money. Even news,
when publicly available, cannot be used as forecasting and trading advantage as
it is almost instantaneously compounded in the market price. In many ﬁnancial
markets computer algorithms are involved in more than half of all ﬁnancial
transactions. Algorithms trade in milliseconds, impounding new information in
prices much quicker than any human trader could, which has a positive eﬀect
on the informativeness of prices (Chaboud et al., 2014).24
The bottom line is, that eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets are very good in 'pro-
ducing' random walks. There is a broad consensus in the academic ﬁnance
community  including many critics of the EMH  that, because of the eﬃ-
ciency of most ﬁnancial markets, it is very hard, if not impossible, for traders to
systematically beat the market (Stracca, 2004).25 In the end we are all greater
or lesser fools in light of the self-produced randomness on ﬁnancial markets.
5.2 No free lunch 6= the price is right
The EMH is probably the most powerful and, at the same time, most hotly
debated principle in Finance. This was demonstrated in 2013, when the Nobel
23For a vivid description of the pitfalls of randomness that ﬁnancial traders falls prey to,
also see Nassim Nicholas Taleb's bestseller `Fooled by randomness' (Taleb, 2005).
24The implications of algorithmic trading for social welfare are less clear. The informational
eﬃciency by speeding up price discovery with machines may not be socially eﬃcient if traders
overinvest in technology due to adverse selection (Biais et al., 2011).
25This insight has led to the phenomenal growth of index funds, which specialize in auto-
matic and therefore very cost-eﬀective investments in large, diversiﬁed index portfolios (the
market return), without the pretense of being able to beat the market.
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Prize in Economics was awarded to three eminent scholars: Eugene Fama, father
of the EMH; Robert Shiller, an outspoken critic of the EMH, and Lars Peter
Hansen, who oﬀered an econometric compromise between the two. The EMH
has two implications: one is that we cannot beat the market (no free lunch);
the other is that, because of this informational eﬃciency, the market price we
observe is a correct estimate of a ﬁnancial asset's future cash ﬂows a.k.a. its
fundamental or intrinsic value (the price is right). The former looks at price
changes (returns), the latter at price levels. In the former we are in a world of
arbitrage which exploits temporary diﬀerences between prices.26 In the latter
we are in a world of market timing, over-/undervaluation and mean reversion,
which exploit diﬀerences to fundamental values. It is the latter of the two worlds
in which we believe to observe 'madness' in markets: bubbles and crashes that
 with hindsight  seem to be everything but 'the right price'.27 As much as
ﬁnancial scholars agree on the former, that we cannot beat the market, they are
critical about the latter, the claim that the price is always right (Stracca, 2004).
To unravel this apparent contradiction we have to understand that the EMH
rests on three, progressively weaker conditions, any one of which will lead to
market eﬃciency: (i) full rationality, (ii) independent deviations from rational-
ity, and (iii) unlimited arbitrage (Shleifer, 2000). Proponents of the EMH argue
that, even if conditions (i) and (ii) do not hold, which is widely accepted, any
systematic pricing errors (biases) will be arbitraged away by more sophisticated
traders. Critics of the EMH argue that the potential of arbitrageurs to reduce
mispricing is limited: arbitrage is not riskless, in many situations there exist
severe liquidity constraints to arbitrage against the market, and arbitrage re-
quires substantial investments in ICT, real-time data, and human capital to
succeed in a very competitive business (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, even
if there is no free lunch, because the market does not oﬀer any feasible arbi-
trage opportunities, this does not necessarily lead to a convergence of prices
to fundamental values (Stracca, 2004). This has been demonstrated by Robert
Shiller, who is well-known for his early warnings of a housing price bubble in a
comparatively ineﬃcient market with very limited arbitrage possibilities.28 A
26A classic example is triangular arbitrage in currency markets. If we pay 2 euro for 1
dollar, 1 dollar for 1 pound, and 1.5 euro for 1 pound, then it makes sense to buy pounds
with euros (1.5:1), sell pounds for dollars (1:1), and sell dollars for euros (1:2) until all three
exchange rates are perfectly balanced.
27A prominent example is the 'tulipmania' in March 1637 in the United Provinces (now the
Netherlands), where a single tulip bulb reached prices of more than 3000 guilders (ﬂorins),
which was about 10 times the annual income of a skilled craftsman. Note that many of the
peak prices were quoted in futures contracts which were later changed by decree into options
contracts. Thus, despite extreme price quotes, it is questionable whether much money had
changed hands between buyers and sellers. (Thompson, 2006)
28Accordingly, Shiller calls for more ﬁnancial innovation that allow trading of risks that
really matter: "Had there been a well-developed real estate market before the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008, it would plausibly have reduced the severity of the crisis, because it would have
allowed, even encouraged, people to hedge their real estate risks. The severity of that crisis
was substantially due to the leveraged undiversiﬁed positions people were taking in the housing
market, causing over 15 million US households to become underwater on their mortgages, and
thus reducing their spending. There is no contradiction at all in saying that there are bubbles
in the housing market and yet saying that we ought to create better and more liquid markets
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related criticism is that arbitrage is limited, because arbitrageurs themselves are
boundedly rational. Then less rational traders (greater fools) are driven out of
the market by more rational traders (lesser fools) so that nobody can beat the
market anymore, but this does not exclude that assets are mispriced. Overall,
"the existence of a pricing bias due to behavioral factors is indeed fully com-
patible with rational expectations and a random walk behavior of asset prices."
(Stracca, 2004, p.395)
5.3 From mispricing to madness
An important diﬀerence between economics and natural sciences is that today's
economic decisions and actions depend on today's beliefs and expectations about
the future (which again can diﬀer from tomorrow's belief about the future). The
predictions, expectations or beliefs of agents about the future are part of a highly
endogenous, dynamic and nonlinear feedback system which requires a theory of
expectations (Hommes, 2013). An early and mathematically very elegant theory
of expectations was the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961; Lucas Jr.,
1972): under assumptions of rationality this hypothesis provides a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium (REE), where expectations and realizations, on average,
coincide. Theoretically, in an eﬃcient market with risk neutral agents, prices
correctly reﬂect all possible future states of an asset's cash ﬂows (discounted
at the risk free rate) and their true, physical (objective) probabilities. Hence,
from eﬃcient risk neutral market prices we can infer state price probabilities
that coincide with objective probabilities.29
The REE refers to situations where we play Roulette with well-deﬁned states,
probability distributions and expected values. We refer to this kind of uncer-
tainty as risk. Risk can be seen as a very special case of uncertainty, but it is
not the norm. Most decisions in life are taken without knowing objective prob-
abilities or all possible states, often referred to as ambiguity (Wakker, 2010).
Ambiguous situations provide a fertile breeding ground for very heterogenous
beliefs and expectations (Stahl, 2013) which agents have to learn about. As
learning is not perfect, boundedly rational systems can be complex, nonlinear
and dynamic (Hommes, 2013). In such an environment, strategic uncertainty
about the beliefs and behavior of others can easily create nonlinear feedback
cycles. This would not be a problem if the system eventually converges to the
REE.30 There are many examples, however, where bounded rationality leads
for housing." (Shiller, 2014, p.1511)
29When markets reﬂect risk aversion, state price probabilities for undesirable (desirable)
states are higher (lower) than objective probabilities (Bossaerts and Oedegaard, 2000). The
equivalent martingale measure (EMM) is a probability measure in mathematical ﬁnance that
adjusts the observed state price probabilities of future outcomes such that they incorporate
investors' risk preferences. The EMM is a central tool in arbitrage pricing. It reﬂects the
probability distribution under which all possible bets are fair given complete markets and
no-arbitrage conditions.
30Attempts by ﬁnance theorists to reconcile evidence of individual non-rational behavior
with aggregate rationality at the market level through learning and evolutionary selection
has proved diﬃcult as they required a number of demanding conditions (see Section 5.2 and
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to deterministic chaos that makes predictions virtually impossible and forecasts
become practically random. Econometric time series studies did not succeed in
ruling out randomness in stock price data (or deterministic chaos) and there
is strong evidence for nonlinear dependence (Hommes, 2013). Hence, while
fully informed rational expectations are self-fulﬁlling in the REE, less informed
prophecies can also be self-fulﬁlling in boundedly rational systems under ambi-
guity.
A typical example of such a feedback cycle are situations where fundamental
values themselves are aﬀected by market evaluations. To illustrate this, take a
look at the market price of Tesla Motors as shown in Figure 4. In mid 2014,
the electric car company is trading at a market value of more than half that
of General Motors, Ford, and Honda. Each of those established companies had
more than 50 times the annual revenues as Tesla. Pure electric cars remain a
niche market, making up less than 1% of total U.S. car sales. And within that,
Tesla is a niche product. Its Model S costs about $75,000, while prices for the
Leaf start around $30,000 and the Volt around $35,000.31 Moreover, in 2014
Tesla sold less e-cars than Nissan.32
Figure 4: Stock price of Tesla Motors, 2010-2014
Is Tesla a bubble? Interestingly, Tesla's CEO himself, Elon Musk, repeatedly
remarked that he considered the stock to be overvalued (see quotes in Figure 4).
Indeed, there are indications that the price is partially driven by speculation.33
Stracca (2004) for a discussion).
31According to marketwatch.com, Oct 3, 2014 2:59 p.m. ET.
32In September 2014, the most sold e-car was Nissan Leaf (2881 units), followed by Tesla's
Model S (1650 units) and Chevrolet's Volt (1394) and BMW's 3i (1022).
33In a cryptic tweet in October 2014, Musk mentioned D and something else. As a popular
investor news site, MarketWatch.com, reported, "Musk's cryptic tweets last Thursday  and
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It may therefore be rational, albeit risky, for investors to ride the bubble as
long as others are still buying. In support of the latter, apparently many people
believe that Tesla will lead a revolution in the car industry. In fact, the high
share price, possibly also driven by pure ﬁnancial speculation, provided enough
funding for Tesla to make some very expensive investments in potentially game-
changing projects.34 Thus, if shareholders' beliefs have been over-optimistic
originally, precisely this deviation from otherwise rational expectations, possibly
reinforced by rational speculation, may have provided Tesla with the necessary
capital to make their beliefs more realistic.
Even with hindsight it will be diﬃcult to disentangle the underlying eﬀects in
Tesla's stock price development. There is often a tendency (probably because
economists are themselves aﬀected by hindsight bias) to regard a certain de-
velopment caused by market developments as unavoidable (supporting the idea
of exogenous rationality). But it can sometimes be the result of a self-fulﬁlling
spiral in which the prime mover is indeed an `endogenous' market whimsical
move. (...) The issue of the feedback mechanism seems most relevant in this
respect. Thus far, there has been no systematic attempt to address the issue of
the feedback from market prices to fundamentals, and only some informal spec-
ulations have been provided (Shiller, 2000b,a; Daniel et al., 2002)." (Stracca,
2004, p.397)
6 Conclusion
Interactions between people are rich in randomness, consciously produced or
unintended. The fertilization of economics and ﬁnance with psychological ideas
and evidence allows for new insights in dealing with randomness in human in-
teractions, but it also adds to the risk of being less parsimonious (Tirole, 2002).
A useful feature of many game theoretical models and the classical REE is that
they impose a strong discipline on the degrees of freedom in economic models.
Boundedly rational models run the risk of incorporating too much randomness
and freedom as if anything goes. To avoid 'ad hoccery', a successful bounded
rationality research program needs to discipline the class of expectations and
decision rules."(Hommes, 2013, p.9) In doing so, and in order to understand
'madness' in markets, more investigation in social psychology rather than indi-
vidual psychology is needed. We need to understand how randomness can be
channeled at the aggregate level in social and economic systems, for example
through the synchronization of expectations with improved market structures
and communication (see, e.g., Shiller (2000b,a)).
the rampant speculation they have fueled since  have pushed Tesla (...) shares about 9%
higher from their Wednesday close."
34Tesla announced that they invest 5 billion US$ in a lithium-ion battery Gigafactory with
a planned production that exceeds the world capacity of 2013. Tesla also embarked on build-
ing an ambitious network of Supercharger stations along roads to facilitate longer distance
journeys.
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